The Big One/YMMV


 * Alpha Strike: The Big One is the ultimate example of an Alpha Strike; the bombers hit every single target in Germany in a single, massive, coordinated blow. This becomes the SAC operational dogma for the rest of the series. However, it is worth noting that in WW 2 the atomic bombs were used as they came off the production lines, not saved for a single massive blow. The difference is explained by differing strategic circumstances and by the dominance of General Le May in the planning process (Le May being the leading proponent of nuclear alpha strikes). Still, it's a debateable point of operational doctrine
 * High Octane Nightmare Fuel: The author doesn't scrimp on the description of a nuclear attack's aftermath, nor on lesser horrors like what napalm and conventional explosions do to people.
 * The description of biowarfare (in the to-be-published sequel High Frontier) is equally horrifying.
 * Moral Dissonance: The inherent contradiction between a strategic bombing policy and the nature of American society becomes steadily more obvious and less comfortable as the series of novels progresses. In the 1982-era story Lion Resurgent,  President Reagan points out that the earlier threatened nuclear strike would have taken out the very people who eventually solved the problem and demands that United States policy be changed to provide a more varied range of responses.
 * Peace Through Superior Firepower: Very explicitly U.S. policy in the TB Overse from 1947 onwards. Essentially, minor wars and conflicts are permitted as long as they are fought for limited purposes in restricted areas and don't involve bystanders. Breaking those rules means the US ensures the aggressor nation ceases to exist. Depending on one's point of view, this has the U.S. either acting as a global peacemaker or a tyrant. The dichotomy in perceptions is explored in the stories.
 * Values Dissonance: The Big One reflects the values and perceptions of the 1930s and 1940s, not those of the 21st century. This particularly comes out in the treatment of strategic bombing. Back then, strategic bombing was seen as a humane alternative to the horror of trench warfare on the western front. It was only during and after the war that the reality of strategic bombing campaigns became apparent and opposition to the concept grew. Likewise, when atomic bombs were first conceived and used, they were seen as just being very powerful bombs and nobody really thought that much about the implications of their use other than the fact they made bombing much more effectve. Today, our attitudes about strategic bombing and using nuclear weapons are very different. This fundamental difference in attitudes between 'Then" and "now" seems to have escaped some critics.